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Abstract
Founded in ancient times, the twin Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla combined comprise
just 11.8 square miles and have fewer than 200,000 inhabitants. Despite their rather
insignificant sizes, they are important because they serve as the only land borders between
the European Union and the African continent, generating a host of complicated questions.
This research explores the role of smuggling as a form of micro-economy and identity.
Through interviews of Moroccans with ties to smuggling as well as interviews with
residents of Ceuta, this case study begins to examine the role smuggling plays in the
debates about the sovereignty of the two cities, among other issues.

Key Words: Ceuta, Melilla, Smuggling, Multiculturalism, Morocco
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Introduction
Comprising just over 30 square kilometers combined, the twin Spanish cities of Ceuta
and Melilla mark two of the most interesting and unique political boundaries on the planet.
The two tiny Spanish enclaves in North Africa, each with populations of around 85,000
inhabitants, are encompassed by Moroccan territory, but open to the world via their ocean
ports.

Pictured: Ceuta as seen from Monte Hacho.
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Pictured: The Port of Melilla.

Historically, the cities have long been of great importance to regional trade,
beginning as early as the 5th century BCE with the Carthaginians. The territory of Ceuta
changed hands several times in the intervening two and a half millennia, significantly
falling to the Portuguese in 1415 after the Battle of Ceuta and ultimately to Spain in 1688
following the Treaty of Lisbon (Britannica, 2009). The city has been subject to Spanish
sovereignty ever since, though this continues to be contested, since the Moroccan
government refuses to accept Spanish hegemony. Melilla, too, has a complicated history.
Originally colonized by the Phoenicians and later the Romans, Melilla fell to Spanish rule in
1497. After acquiring the nearby territory in 1909, Spain modernized Melilla’s port and
turned the city into a military garrison to support Spanish Morocco. 12 years later, in 1921,
the Rif War (sometimes known as the Melilla War) broke out between Spain and Berber
tribes led by Abd el-Krim, which almost managed to claim the city. In 1995, Spain approved
statutes of autonomy for Ceuta and Melilla, granting the cities status more akin to Spain’s
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other autonomous communities (Britannica, 2010). To this day, Madrid still contends that
Ceuta, Melilla, and the other plazas de soberanía (literally places of sovereignty), are an
“integral part of Spanish territory” (Howe, 2005, p. 314).
Despite the international recognition of Spanish rule over the cities, it was clear from
my visits to Ceuta and Melilla that the cities are still of great importance to Morocco. At
each of my border crossings, as I waited in the queue to enter and exit the country through
the heavily guarded and fortified borders, I was struck by the number of Moroccans
bringing enormous bags of goods back from the European colonies. At certain times of day,
it seems there is a near constant flow of Moroccans carrying back goods to their home
country. It was this observation that led me to my research questions.
As contested colonial holdings, it seems obvious that Moroccans would side with their
government in its demands for sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla and the other populated
Spanish territories, composed mostly of small islands lining the Moroccan coast. For most
groups, this is probably true, yet there are some Moroccans who have much to gain from
having a convenient piece of Spain on the African continent. I sought to understand the
mentality of the select group of Moroccans who are perhaps most familiar with Ceuta and
Melilla: the traders who enter regularly to bring back foreign goods to re-sell in Morocco.
How do Moroccan smugglers feel about the issue of Ceuta and Melilla’s sovereignty? Do
they agree with their government despite the fact that their economic livelihoods depend
on the cities’ colonial statuses? How are trade issues related to issues of identity? Why is
this trade necessary? How is it organized? Are traders bringing goods that can’t be acquired
in Morocco easily? What kinds of things are they buying? What, if any, status is achieved by
Moroccans who later buy these Western goods?
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Literature Review
Preface
One of the greatest challenges in undertaking this research was the apparent dearth
of recent scholarship, especially scholarship readily accessible in English. This review
examines the existing literature and attempts to place the work of others into several broad
categories. Specifically, this review will examine the history of the border disputes between
the kingdoms of Morocco and Spain, review the complicated histories of Ceuta and Melilla,
examine literature about smuggling between the two autonomous cities and Morocco, as
well as examine other issues related to the land borders between the two countries. It is
important to review and understand the historical context and intricacies of the border
dynamics before exploring and examining the data gathered in the present study.
History of the Border Disputes and Evaluating Claims
At present, Spain controls a number of small territories in North Africa, as well as
the notable cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Ceuta and Melilla are considered to be the two major
territories, while the Islas Alhucemas, Islas Chafarinas, and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera
constitute the minor holdings, containing military garrisons but no stable civilian
population. One might also add the islet of Perejil to this list, which at present is
unoccupied but has been another source of contention between Spain and Morocco.
Since Morocco achieved independence in 1956, the country has laid claim to all of
what it perceives to be Spain’s lingering colonial holdings. Moroccan claims to Ceuta and
Melilla have found little support from the international community, first discussing the
matter in the UN on October 7, 1960, though they did not ask to have the cities included on
the General Assembly’s list of non-self-governing territories (Trinidad, 2012, p. 965). It was
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not until January 1975 that Morocco formally asked the UN Decolonization Committee to
include the so-called colonial enclaves on their list of non-self-governing territories, which
was interpreted by the Spanish government as “a threat to Spain’s national unity and
territorial integrity” (Wiegand, 2011, p. 187). That summer, in June, Spanish and Moroccan
troops met at the borders of the enclaves, following a series of bombings in Ceuta and
Melilla, with 400 Moroccans arrested as suspects. Tensions would further escalate in
November of that year when King Hassan issued a bold threat to Spain’s new king, Juan
Carlos, stating that if Spain were to acquire Gibraltar from the British, Morocco would have
to claim Ceuta and Melilla, stating that “no power can permit Spain to possess both keys to
the same straits” (ibid). Tensions would not die down in the ensuing years, as a group
known as the Moroccan Patriotic Front bombed locations in the two cities in 1978 and
1979.
Other than these occasional outbursts of violence by private citizens, the conflict
between the two countries has remained largely quiet and diplomatic in recent decades,
with one exception. In July 2002, members of the Moroccan armed forces occupied the islet
of Perejil, and raised a Moroccan flag over the small island. Officially, the move was part of
an effort to combat terrorism and illegal immigration, though the Spanish were quick to
condemn this action. Feeling threatened, Madrid deployed naval units, special ground
forces, as well as combat aircraft to defend what German political scientist Daniel-Erasmus
Khan describes as a “virtually worthless piece of rock” (Trinidad, 2012 p. 964; BBC, 2002).
Ultimately, six Moroccans were taken prisoner and brought to Ceuta before they were
repatriated hours later. Spain also replaced the Moroccan flag on the island with two
Spanish flags. Why spark an international incident over such a small and insignificant piece
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of land? It seems likely that the then-recently crowned king of Morocco, Mohammad VI,
was eager to test Madrid’s resolve, as well as to gauge the international reaction and
perhaps renew the conversation about Morocco’s sovereignty claims (Trinidad, 2012, p.
964). Indeed, talking about the incident, former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar
remarked “los marroquíes han hecho algo illegal. Es cierto que para nosotros Perejil tiene un
valor simbólico. Lo tiene para ellos y para nosotros. Pero si nosotros no reaccionamos, será
interpretado como debilidad, y no sabemos cuál es el paso siguiente que darán” (Iglesias,
2010, p. 404). (The Moroccans have done something illegal. It is true that for us Perejil has
a symbolic value. It has symbolic value for them and for us. But if we did not react, it will be
interpreted as weakness, and we don’t know what their next step would be.)
Despite all of the political rhetoric and rising tensions, it seems unlikely for the time
being that Morocco will be able to annex any of the populated territories peacefully
(though it should be noted that Spain considered ceding control of Melilla to Morocco on
and relinquishing Ceuta as an international zone in 1979) (Europa Press, 2017). With the
implicit support of the international community, Spain negotiates from a position of power.
The most difficult element in resolving the dispute over the enclaves, notes Trinidad, is the
human aspect (Trinidad, 2012, p. 974). It is perhaps quixotic for Morocco to believe that it
could claim Ceuta and Melilla any time soon, though there may be hope for some of the
smaller Spanish territories. There is less emotional attachment to these places, and the
Spanish government considered abandoning Vélez as early as 1871. Tabling claims to the
major territories and focusing on the smaller ones may be the most effective strategy for
Moroccan irredentism (Trinidad, 2012, p. 975).
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A Brief History of Ceuta
As previously stated, the rich and complex history of Ceuta dates back to ancient
times, with some sources suggesting the area was inhabited as early as the 5th century BCE.
As the early Muslim conquests spread west, Arabs first arrived on the scene in present day
Ceuta in the 8th century CE. Sebta, as the city is known in Arabic, maintained a strong Arab
presence from then on, with the city flourishing as a critical Mediterranean port city under
a series of caliphates and emirates (Gold, 2000, p. xi). Culturally, the city also prospered
under Muslim domination, and by the 15th century, the city contained over one thousand
mosques, 62 libraries, 43 educational institutes, and a university (O’Reilly, 1994, p. 2).
Across the strait of Gibraltar, however, Muslim domination faltered. The Reconquista
efforts led by the Catholic monarchs Isabella I and Fernando II successfully removed the
last political vestige of Moorish Spain in 1492 with the capture of the city of Grenada.
Shortly before the conclusion of the Reconquista, Juan I, King of Portugal, crossed the Strait
of Gibraltar and claimed Ceuta by force in 1415 (O’Reilly, 1994, p. 2). In 1580, the two
Iberian crowns united, and upon their dissolution in 1640, Ceuta opted to remain under
Spanish rule. From this point on, the city would remain under Spanish dominion, though
the city’s flag to this day recognizes its Portuguese heritage, featuring the same background
as the flag of Lisbon, and contains the shield configuration of Portugal. Though the city has
never since changed hands, it has been subject to attack from Muslim forces, with notable
sieges in 1728, 1732, and 1771 (ibid).
Even though the city has never been a particularly important population center, it
has served several important roles in Spanish history. When it was initially claimed, Ceuta,
along with other plazas, served as a first line of defense against Muslim incursions into the
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Iberian Peninsula, supported the crusade efforts (with the plazas offering shelter to
Christian shippers), and enhanced Spain’s status as a powerful force in the Mediterranean,
with military garrisons to help stage important colonial wars. Additionally, Ceuta served as
penal colony in the 17th and 18th centuries before becoming an economic hub as a free port
city in the 19th century.
In more recent years, Spain enhanced its claim to Ceuta and Melilla as a result of the
country’s European integration. In 1986, just over a decade after the end of the Franco
regime, Spain officially ascended to the European Union, which automatically made the two
enclaves part of the EU, as well. Five years later, in 1991, Spain’s borders in Ceuta and
Melilla were “Schengenized,” a process whose importance will become apparent later in
this review (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, p. 305). Lastly, as part of Spain’s integration into
Europe, the country began the process of enhancing border security in 1995. This was in
line with the immigration policies of other new-immigration countries in Southern Europe,
who have shown their willingness to be ‘good citizens’ of the continent by raising border
defenses. This should be taken with a grain of salt, notes Marenin, as the visibility of the
Spanish border fence presents a façade of control yet in reality only serves to redirect the
flow of migration (Marenin, 2006, p. 70).
A Brief History of Melilla
Like its twin, the territory now referred to as Melilla has a rich history dating back
to ancient times. Between the 10th and 13th centuries, the city prospered as a fortified trade
stop between Muslim Spain, North Italian city-states, as well as trans-Saharan traffic from
Timbuktu (Driessen, 1991, p. 8). The city started to decay in the late 1300’s, due to dynastic
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struggles between the sultanates of Fez and Tlemcen, and by the time the Spanish arrived,
the city was already abandoned and partly ruined (Driessen, 1991, p. 9).
In 1497, Spanish forces led by Pedro de Estopiñán took the ailing city with relative
ease, beginning a period of uninterrupted Spanish control that persists to this day. In 1863,
Melilla and Ceuta acquired free-port status, partially transforming the role of the garrison
cities (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, p. 305).
After decades of European intervention in Moroccan affairs, the French established
a protectorate in March 1912, capitalizing on the military and political weakness of the
Moroccan state. Seeking to establish a buffer between the newly established protectorate
and the British military stronghold at Gibraltar, the French granted Spain their own
protectorate, with a “sublease” of some 7,700 square miles in the north of Morocco at the
tail end of the year. This connected Spain’s twin enclaves and allowed the country to regain
a taste of empire after their devastating defeat in the Spanish-American war at the tail end
of the 19th century.
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Pictured: A man tends to his flock outside of the crumbling remains of a Spanish administrative building in Zaio, Morocco.

Melilla would serve as a key garrison and staging point in Spain’s ill-fated attempt to
control their newly acquired colony, and it would turn disastrous with the outbreak of the
Rif War, sometimes known as the War of Melilla. United Rif peoples, under the leadership
of Muhammad Abd el-Krim, rose up against the Spanish in a bloody war that lasted from
1921-1926, with Abd el-Krim’s forces almost taking Melilla in 1921. Notably, the city was
also the first to rise against the Popular Front government of Spain in the summer of 1936,
which helped precipitate the Spanish Civil War. (Flemming, 2014; Britannica 2010).
Smuggling
Though Morocco remains adamant that Ceuta, Melilla, and the other plazas de
soberanía (places of sovereignty) are inherently Moroccan, a huge number of Moroccans
depend upon the colonial status of Ceuta and Melilla for their livelihoods. Indeed, as noted
by Ferrer-Gallardo, some 20,000 people crossed the border into each enclave daily in 2008
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(Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, p. 311). Despite the intense security measures in place, (including a
series of metal fences 3.5-6 meters high equipped with thermal and infrared cameras,
pepper sprays, as well as barbed wire) some Moroccans are easily able to enter the cities as
a consequence of the “Schengenization” of the border. The Spanish border is selectively
penetrable; the significant security apparatus is designed to deter “undesirable” entrants
such as sub-Saharan Africans seeking passage to Europe, but allows relatively easy and
open access to the permitted and “exceptionally Schengenized” Moroccans bearing
passports from either the Tetouan or Nador region (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, p. 310).
Given the territories’ status as free ports with special tax policies, it should come as
no surprise that smuggling thrives in the north of Morocco. In 1970, economic inequality
between Spain and Morocco was moderate, with Spanish GDP per capita sitting at roughly
four times that of their neighbor to the south. In 2004, however, Spain’s GDP per capita was
15 times larger, making it the most unequal border in the European Union, or of any
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member state (Moré,
2011, p. 8). Reliable estimates for the value of the informal economy are hard to come by,
though a 2002 study by the Ceuta Chamber of Commerce placed its lowest estimate for socalled “border trade” at 600 million Euros annually. Moré suggests that a reasonable
estimate for the value of the Ceuta-Melilla smuggling operation hovers around 1 billion
Euros annually, equal to half of the value of all declared exports from Spain to Morocco for
which tariffs are paid (Moré, 2011, p. 41).
Additionally, considering Morocco’s political disagreements with Spain over the
sovereignty of the cities, there is little impetus for the developing nation to try to rein in the
widespread smuggling. As Gold notes, Morocco has little interest in improving the security
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of the borders with any real ardor, as this would tacitly imply to Spain and the rest of the
world that the borders with Ceuta and Melilla are indeed legitimate (Gold, 2000, p. 171).
Spain, for its part, also does not wish to see the smuggling curtailed. Gold also notes that
much of the commercial activity in the twin enclaves is dependent upon the ease with
which duty-free products can be passed across the border with Morocco and into the rest
of the African continent. Without this, Gold postulates, Spain would be forced to take on the
cumbersome task of subsidizing the economic livelihood of the enclaves (ibid).
Citing the work of Hajjaji, Ferrer-Gallardo identifies three different kinds of
smugglers that work between Morocco and Spain. Among them are the more casual,
occasional smugglers who bring back tobacco, alcohol, or electrical appliances (a group
consisting mostly of foreign workers, students, civil servants, and generally any Spaniard or
Moroccan who can easily enter and exit the enclaves); regular day-to-day subsistence
smugglers who bring a constant flow of consumption goods (at the time of his research
performed several times daily by inhabitants of Moroccan border towns); and lastly largescale smugglers who bring big electronic equipment such as satellite dishes and other
expensive goods, performed by an organized network of professional smugglers (FerrerGallardo, 2008, p. 312).
It is unclear exactly what the effect of this expansive informal trade has been on the
Moroccan economy. Though it is clear through the demographic and urban expansion of
Moroccan border towns like Nador that the particular border dynamics have generated
seriously lucrative opportunity in a region of the country especially crippled by the poor
economy, this growth is not without its detriments to the national financial systems. It is
impossible for Moroccan manufacturing to compete with the prices generated by the free
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ports of Ceuta and Melilla. With Spanish smuggled goods making it at least as far as south
as Casablanca, the trade deeply affects many aspects of Morocco’s national economy.
Indeed, as noted by Mateos, at least two factories that produced televisions in Casablanca
have ceased production due to their illegal competitors (Mateos, 2005, p. 249).
Lastly, it is important to review how it is that Morocco’s massive smuggling industry
operates above the law. According to Mateos, getting past customs with goods involves first
establishing specific police contacts to facilitate the process. Once contacts have been
established, smugglers pay bribes to police officers, as well as offer them “gifts,” which
include various household items. The gifts can vary to a great degree, with smugglers who
bring in more expensive items often having monetary commission or more valuable gifts
demanded of them by customs officials (Mateos, 2005, p. 249-250).
Mateos also notes that, rather oddly, male smugglers mostly work alone whereas
female smugglers work together. Women apparently work together to protect themselves
from the police, and to ensure they have enough money to pass through customs. Working
together has its benefits, according to Mateos’ smuggler contact, as he believed that women
profit more than men by using their feminine charm to cut better deals at every obstacle
(ibid).
Bribery, it seems, does not end at the border. Writing about his experience in Nador,
scholar David A. McMurray observed that smugglers often sell their own wares to retailers
or hawk their products on the street in regular locations so that their clients would be able
to find them. Spending so much time in the public eye came with a cost, as hawking
required a steep bribe to the mukhazni (local police agents). McMurray estimates that these
bribes could cost vendors more than 10 percent of their take (McMurray, 2001, p. 110). (It
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should be noted that since McMurray’s estimates were made more than a decade ago, it is
possible that traders now lose even higher percentages of their take to bribes).
Other Issues of Transnationalism
As one might suspect, smuggling is far from the only problem created by the
unequal borders between Spain and Morocco. Migration, particularly of sub-Saharan
migrants seeking passage to Europe, has proven to be a major challenge to manage, despite
the intense security measures and precautions at the border described above. Tensions rise
and fall, though perhaps the worst incident occurred in June of 1996. Following the election
of a conservative government led by José María Aznar, Spain committed one of the most
heinous operations in the country’s modern history when 103 African illegal immigrants
living in Melilla were taken across the Strait to Málaga, where they were drugged and
placed on military planes before being deported to assorted African countries, regardless of
where they had actually come from (Carr, 1997, p. 61). Despite intense criticism from
various human rights organizations, the Spanish government was largely unrepentant for
their actions, with then-Interior Minister Jaime Mayor Oreja describing their deportations
as “disagreeable” and “unaesthetic.” Aznar more coldly declared, “we had a problem and we
solved it” (ibid).
For those migrants that do make it to Ceuta or Melilla, life is rarely easy. Many of the
migrants who reach the cities have traveled thousands of miles by land, but without proper
documentation they become effectively stateless in their new foreign home. Here they are
denied permission to cross to the mainland, but also cannot be turned back, as the
Moroccan government will not accept responsibility for them, citing the fact that there is no
official evidence proving that the migrants entered the cities from Morocco. This is pretty
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clearly politically motivated, as accepting these migrants would reflect a tacit acceptance of
Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves (Carr, 1997, p. 64-65).
Unable to leave or to work in the cities, many migrants survive on occasional charity
provided by relief organizations. In October 1995, around a hundred migrants attempted to
draw attention to the appalling conditions in which they lived by blocking streets and
throwing stones at passing traffic. The police and civilian population were quick to
respond, and many of the immigrants were forced to jump into the ocean to avoid being
lynched by enraged mobs hurling racial epithets. The mayor of Ceuta, Basilio Fernández,
defended the actions of the civilian population as “legitimate self-defense” and
subsequently called for authorities to deport all illegal immigrants from the city (Carr,
1997, p. 65-66).
Beyond the issues of migration, Ceuta and Melilla must grapple with a heightened
risk of terrorist activity. As of Spring 2015, it is estimated that Ceuta and Melilla have
contributed more recruits to ISIS per capita than any other town in Europe (Frayer, 2015).
As Ceuta is plagued by steep unemployment (over 30% officially as of May 2015), the
threat is heightened, especially as the Arabic-speaking half of the population is
disproportionately poorer (ibid). The security forces of the cities remain on high alert, and
occasionally do make arrests of individuals suspected of ties to the terrorist organization
(El País, 2017).
Integration between ceutíes of European origin and North African origin is severely
limited. According to Felix Arteaga, a researcher at Spain’s Elcano Royal think tank, “There
are very few mixed marriages. Integration isn’t working at all. And the Muslim birth rate is
double or triple the Spanish average… That’s becoming a problem for public services,
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housing, water, electricity and schools” (Frayer, 2015). Indeed, Spain spends more money
on welfare per capita in the two enclaves than in any other Spanish cities (ibid).
Conclusion
For two cities composing fewer than 200,000 inhabitants and occupying less than
15 square miles combined, there is quite a lot worthy of study and discussion. The twinned
cities are steeped in rich history, with power shifting between regional rivals over
thousands of years. With the cities currently under Spanish control, a fascinating border
dynamic has emerged with the only land border between the European Union and the
African continent. The multicultural society within each city is plagued by myriad
problems, ranging from issues related to immigration, terrorism, and trade with Morocco,
whose effects penetrate deep into Moroccan society. This mélange of conflicts and
quandaries sets the stage for the research presented herein, looking at personal accounts of
smuggling in Morocco and Spanish perceptions of their cities to better understand some of
the dynamics inherent in this form of commerce, what smuggling might mean to the
informal economies in Morocco and Spain, and how it contributes more broadly to issues of
national identity.
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Methodology
Introduction
In an attempt to answer the questions posed in this paper’s introduction, my
research employed a mixed method approach involving participant observation paired
with a series of in-depth interviews as well as casual conversations with Moroccans. This
project took me around Northern Morocco and into Spain, where it was primarily
conducted in five distinct settings: Ceuta, Melilla, the border crossings for each city, and in
Zaio – a small city near Nador on the Moroccan side of the border.
Observation and Discovery
The first week of my research was conducted on site in Ceuta. In an attempt to
understand the culture of the city, I first visited a number of historic locations in the town
including the Fortaleza de Hacho (Hacho Fort), the Arab Baths, and the Royal Walls. These
visits, coupled with tours of the Museo de Ceuta (Ceuta Museum) and the Museo Histórico
Militar del Desnarigado (Desnarigado Military History Museum) supplemented my
firsthand knowledge of the city.
In addition to studying the official histories presented in these locations, I spent
much of my time in Ceuta observing how people interacted in public. Specifically, I listened
carefully to the languages people used, whether they spoke in just Spanish or Arabic or
both. Did people I perceived to be of North African origin (based on their usage of Darija
and style of dress) interact with people I perceived to be of Iberian origin, and if so, in what
ways?
Lastly, on my observation days I spent time looking for indicators of the
multicultural identity of the city. I looked for any signs of North African identity, in the
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overwhelmingly Spanish city. This included looking at (and photographically documenting)
signage, graffiti, and street art, as well as seeking out centers of Muslim culture like
mosques. Though my time in Melilla was limited to just one day due to time and budgetary
constraints, I employed a similar methodology in getting to know the other enclave.
Time spent crossing the borders was not squandered. While entering and exiting
Spain, I paid special attention to the other people coming and going. I lingered for as long as
I could without raising suspicion from the border authorities, and in both cities I spent time
observing the people just beyond the crossing. I had hoped to establish contact with
smugglers in this setting, though it was very apparent while there that it would be difficult
to do so without raising the suspicions of the many security officers watching.
Back on the Moroccan side of the border, in Zaio, observation took place primarily in
grocery stores. To see the true extent of smuggling, it was critical to see where a large
percentage of smuggled goods end up before disappearing into people’s private homes, and
since a significant amount of the goods appeared to be food or toiletries sold in groceries,
this seemed a logical site in which to conduct research.
Interviews and Casual Conversation
Interviewing and casual conversation proved to be the most challenging part of this
research. Despite being armed with intermediate Modern Standard Arabic and fairly strong
Spanish, communication proved rather difficult. With more patient speakers of Spanish,
however, I was able to conduct 7 formal interviews in Ceuta as well as countless casual
conversations around the north of Morocco and the enclaves. The purpose of these
interviews and conversations was to glean background information and uncover the
feelings of individuals about a wide range of topics, ranging from the sovereignty question
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to smuggling to their personal relationship with Morocco. (See appendix section for a
complete list of questions).
In Morocco, I hoped to have a chance to interview at least one smuggler. With the
help of a friend from the area, I was able to establish four possible smuggler contacts,
though three of them refused to answer questions. The smuggler who did agree to answer
questions, however, was not willing to meet with me personally, so the interview was
conducted through a mutually trusted third-party. I supplied all of the questions for the
interviewer, who was gracious enough to take diligent notes, which made this research
possible. Through the same friend, I was also able to establish contact with a grocer in a
Moroccan border town.
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Findings
In Search of a Smuggler
Though I was only able to establish solid contact with one active smuggler, the
results are no less fascinating. This individual, who I will refer to as Youssef, bravely
provided me with a tremendous amount of detail about his routine and daily life, which I
will retell as faithfully as possible. Youssef’s story, I’m told, fits in well with the greater
narrative of Moroccan male smugglers, but I will make note of details that make him an
exceptional case. It also needs to be said that within this case study, I cannot know for sure
the extent to which Youssef’s story is similar to that of other smugglers’.
Life of Youssef
Youssef has worked as a smuggler for between 3-5 years. The focus of his work is on
smuggling small comestibles and household products, unlike other smugglers who focus on
more expensive items like clothing (or in some rarer cases, narcotics).
Most of the time, he works four days a week, from Monday through Thursday. His
day begins quite early, leaving home around 4:30 AM and the days run long with him often
not returning to Zaio until 7:30 or 8:00 PM. Working a 15-hour day or longer, one might be
surprised to learn that Youssef only spends one hour each day in Melilla; it takes him 4
hours waiting in line to cross the border with his car, so most of the day is spent waiting
around.
Like many other smugglers, Youssef works as an informal supplier for four or five
groceries. Youssef’s clientele are scattered around various towns near the Spanish border.
This is the common practice among his peers, because the price of goods becomes less
competitive if they have to be transported to larger urban centers, like Oujda, which are far
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from their source. In this line of work, smugglers will pay visit to their stable network of
clients at night, and be given a list of goods that the grocers need purchased the next day.
Youssef is paid by his clients after certain goods are solid in the grocery store. On occasion,
smugglers like Youssef will return from Melilla with goods that were not on any client’s list.
When this happens, smugglers ask around to see if any groceries need their goods, and if
not, they offer them to their regular clients, with an agreement that they will receive
payment if the product is sold. Using this method, smugglers also navigate any potential
conflicts with grocers who refuse goods that are brought to them.
Unlike many smugglers, Youssef is unique in having his own car to aid in his work.
Smugglers with cars, I’m told, typically remain in this line of work longer, though it comes
with certain added difficulties. The majority of smugglers do not own cars, so they either
carry their goods on their backs, or they carpool and cooperate with other smugglers. To
aid in this process, there are also smugglers whose job is strictly focused on the
transportation of goods to the border crossing where they are then taken to Morocco by
other smugglers. For the car-less variety of smuggler, everything is smaller. They pay less
in bribes to authorities, bring back smaller amounts of goods, and earn less money. They
do, however, have the ability to make 2-3 trips daily, unlike their automobiled counterparts
who can only make the trek once a day (though it should be noted that in the past, when
transnational smuggling was in a more inchoate stage, smugglers with cars could make 3-4
trips a day and earn a lot of money).
For those smugglers fortunate enough to have their own cars, Youssef informs me, a
bribe must be paid to police on the Moroccan side of the border twice daily. Bribes are
variable in cost depending on the type of good being transported. For his particular set of
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goods, including food, toothpaste, chocolate, and soap, among other items, Youssef pays
bribes of 50 dirham (roughly 5 USD) at each of the two checkpoints. If smugglers like
Youssef do not pay their dues to police, the potential repercussions are serious, as they may
be stopped and have their goods seized the next time they try to pass through (arrests are
typically only made if they are smuggling alcohol or other drugs). With an established set of
clients and the cooperation of his police contacts, Youssef is able to turn a profit of roughly
200 dirham ($20) per day.
Another distinction that sets apart Youssef from his peers is his level of education.
While most smugglers have a high school education or less, Youssef managed to obtain a
bachelor’s degree in law. He felt his country had failed him, having wasting his time and
effort when he was unable to secure a job after graduation. As a smuggler, he feels, he has
taken charge of his own life and is proud to be getting by without the assistance of the
government.
When asked about the issue of sovereignty over the enclaves, Youssef expressed
indifference towards the matter. He felt like his home country had let him down, and that
he didn’t care what happened because he knows he is exploited by both Morocco and
Spain. Youssef, along with many thousands of other smugglers, contribute to the Spanish
economy, but receive no help along the way. The only “support” he receives is the relative
indifference from Spanish authorities. It is unclear if Youssef has any legal job prospects for
the future, but for now, at least, Youssef knows what he has to do to take care of himself.
At the Grocery
I was also fortunate enough to ask questions to a grocer who works with smugglers
like Youssef. Hicham, as I will call him, operates a modest independent grocery store in
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Zaio, a small city around an hour by car from the Melilla border. Hicham’s grocery sells a
wide variety of comestibles, with products produced both in Spain and in Morocco.
Interestingly, Hicham notes that sometimes his clients will ask him if he has any other
brands of a product when they notice the one they picked out was made in Morocco. He
usually does, and reports that his clients are pleased when he informs them that he also has
a version of the same product produced in Spain. “Made in Spain” is something of a magic
phrase for Hicham. Clients are most often intrigued by the Spanish alternative, and are
usually willing to pay a little bit extra for the Spanish version of the same product.
When asked about why this preference for Spanish goods exists, Hicham stated he
believed it had to do with quality standards. There is a general consensus among his
customers that goods from Spain can be presumed to be of a high quality, based on the
assumption that they conform to EU regulations of health and safety.
As noted earlier, all sorts of goods are brought back from Spain to be sold in
Morocco, but Hicham’s primary Spanish goods are food items. Shopkeepers do sell the
whole gamut of Spanish merchandise, but have a tendency to tailor their selection to a
particular type of business. Even selling just food and other household products, Hicham
estimates that up to 40% of the goods in his store are Spanish in origin.
In order to keep his business operating smoothly, with a constant flow of Spanish
imports, Hicham employs two permanent smugglers. His “employees” trek back and forth
from Melilla daily to acquire a predetermined list of goods, in the same way that Youssef
does for his grocer-contractor. Many grocers, notes Hicham, employ several smugglers to
keep their shelves stocked, but there is always one primary smuggler who acquires the
bulk of the goods needed by the grocery on any given day. Even with the failsafe of
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employing multiple smugglers, however, grocers still run into problems with their runners.
Sometimes smugglers are unable to acquire certain goods on their lists, causing periodic
outages of certain products. Other times, there is discord between smugglers and their
contractors as to how much a product should be sold for, as grocers will complain that
other smugglers charge less for the same product.
Relying on smugglers to obtain up to 40% of his wares introduces a fair amount of
uncertainty in the day-to-day operations of Hicham’s business. Asked about the question of
Melilla’s sovereignty, Hicham was hesitant to give an answer. Clearly, he understood the
potential repercussions if Melilla were to join Morocco and the flow of Spanish goods to
Zaio would at very least be interrupted. After some hesitation, however, Hicham responded
that the enclaves “are parts of Morocco, of course.”
Across the Border: Impressions of Spaniards in border territories
While Youssef, and thousands of others like him, struggle to get by through
smuggling, the Spanish look on from their clean, orderly, and well-developed enclaves. The
cities obviously have a strong economic relationship with Morocco, but does the
relationship extend beyond the informal trade? I spoke with a number of Spanish residents
of Ceuta to inquire about the dimensions of the Moroccan-Spanish relationship.
Perceptions of Smuggling and Migration
At Ceuta’s city tourism office, I spoke with an employee, herein referred to as María.
Originally from peninsular Spain, María has lived in Ceuta for nearly two decades. With her
extensive knowledge of the city and its history, I was able to glean some important
information. In trying to broach the polemical subject of smuggling with her, we spoke
about the problems facing Ceuta. She was eager from the outset, it seemed, to downplay the
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myriad problems of migration, smuggling, and terrorism addressed elsewhere in this
paper. The biggest problems, according to her, were the cost associated with visiting the
enclave, as well as the difficulties in reaching it when the weather is poor. When bluntly
asked about the issues of smuggling and migration, however, María opened up. She
understood smuggling to be an important activity at the border, but described the
conditions that smugglers work in as “inhumano” (inhumane). Seeing these people carry
twice their body weight on their backs made her sad, though it does not seem to her like
the Spanish government cares to curtail this practice beyond current regulations (she
believed that the officials only do not permit smugglers to carry back bags that touch the
ground). Asked about why migrants seek to enter to Ceuta, María suggested that they come
to Spain seeking somewhere “más civilizado y desarollado” (more civilized and developed).
I also spoke with Carlos, a man in his 50’s, who operates a souvenir shop in Ceuta.
Discussing the problems facing the city, Carlos was quick to note the major issues the
enclave faces with unemployment, which as noted earlier, sits at a staggering 30%. With
unemployment figures so high, Carlos felt that Moroccans were in part to blame, as he
believes that many Moroccans work illegally in the city as day laborers on construction
sites, as waiters in restaurants, and as housecleaners. The Spanish, for their part, do not do
much on the other side of the border. Mostly, he thought, Spaniards crossed the border to
buy cheaper produce and occasionally to rent houses on the beach during vacations.
Despite his reservations about Moroccans coming into Ceuta, however, he
personally benefited from the existence of the smuggling industry. In his souvenir shop,
Carlos sold a wide variety of keepsakes, but the most eye-catching items for sale were of
Moroccan origin. Just beyond the doorway of his shop, Carlos advertised the many
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Moroccan goods for sale, including multicolored Moroccan slippers, hamsa necklaces, and
beautiful kaftans (a type of traditional Moroccan dress). The dresses, Carlos informed me,
he purchased in bulk from a Moroccan smuggler who brought them into the city, which he
then resells to visitors for a small profit.

Pictured: Moroccan style kaftans for sale outside of Carlos’ shop.

Perceptions of Multiculturalism
Asked about the North African culture of the city María informed me that Ceuta does
indeed serve as a metaphorical bridge between cultures, reflected in the city’s Andalusian
culture and cuisine. Despite her insistence that the city embraced its multiculturalism,
some other statements and facts seemed to contradict this. For example, María is one of
nine employees at the tourism office, yet only one of her colleagues spoke any Arabic at all.
Others were less certain that the city had any sort of multicultural identity. One
interviewee remarked that, with regards to the Muslim inhabitants of the city, “somos
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hermanos, pero ellos tienen su propia lengua y cultura” (we are brothers, but they have their
own language and culture). Also revealing, this interviewee added that if I wanted to talk
with some Muslim residents of Ceuta, he could direct me to a neighborhood where they
live, suggesting the ethnic segregation of the city. In a different encounter, one interviewee
suggested that any notion of multiculturalism in the city was a sham, though rather
ironically, he occasionally inserted Arabic words into his speech.
I also spoke with Juan, who is an employee in the Museo de Ceuta (Ceuta Museum),
which is housed in a pavilion of the city’s old barracks constructed by the Corps of Military
Engineers. Offering exhibitions on the enclave’s ancient, medieval, and modern history, the
museum is one of the most important cultural hubs of the city. Juan is a lifelong resident of
Ceuta, and his family has lived in the city for over a century. Citing his lifetime of experience
and career in the museum, he confidently stated that “la vida cotidiana de la ciudad es como
cualquier ciudad Europea… No parece que sea África ni Árabe” (the daily life of the city is
like any European city… it doesn’t seem African or Arab).
Thoughts about National Identity
On the issue of sovereignty, María was adamant that Ceuta was an integral part of
the Spanish state and could never be ceded to Morocco. “Una cosa que nunca ha sido tuya no
se puede devolver.” (Something that has never been yours cannot be returned.) She also
compared Spain’s control of Ceuta to the existence of countries like Monaco and
Lichtenstein: countries whose independence is not geographically logical but persist
because of their unique histories, cultures, and identities. While he did believe the culture
and the daily life of the city to be very European, Juan acknowledged that the city faces
legitimate challenges of coexistence between people of North African origin and Iberian
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origin, not unlike the sectarian conflicts in the United States. In addition to this problem,
Juan was gravely concerned about immigration issues. Spain, he noted, “es un país que no
puede admitir inmigrantes porque España no está preparada económicamente para
aguantar esta presión… España no está preparada para recibir…” (is a country that cannot
admit immigrants because it is not economically prepared to endure that pressure… Spain
is not ready to receive…).
Observations
Walking around Ceuta and Melilla, it was quite difficult to get a sense of a genuine
multicultural identity, from the perspective of an outsider. Official signage around the cities
– in museums, on street signs, and in public advertising – rarely appears in languages other
than Spanish, and when it does, the alternative is almost never in Arabic. Public spaces that
should suggest a multicultural identity, like the Arab baths in Ceuta, do indeed exist, though
they are not prominent attractions of the cities (when I visited the Arab baths at midday, I
was the only person there). On the streets, people in European dress with physical traits
associated with European heritage talked among themselves in Spanish. Others, dressed in
a more conservative, North African style with North African traits usually spoke in North
African tongues (Darija in Ceuta, Tarafit in Melilla) and only rarely switched over to
Spanish, at least as far I was able to observe.
In most public places, Ceuta and Melilla do not appear any different from the
archetypal Spanish city. One of the most prominent distinctions, however, is the existence
of graffiti in Arabic, abundantly found in Ceuta. Graffiti, which some researchers have
explored as an alternative art form, is often used to express social and political messages
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outside of mainstream venues. It is therefore of interest to not the presence of graffiti in
border cities like Ceuta and Melilla.

Pictured: Arabic graffiti in Ceuta. The artist began by writing the Arabic word for “Spain,” though most of the work has been destroyed
and painted over.

In a tunnel outside of a prominent church in Ceuta, I found the word “Spain” painted
on the wall in Arabic. There was clearly more written beyond this simple word, though
somebody else had noticed this, and painted over the rest of the phrase and rendered it
inscrutable.
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Discussion
Clearly, there is no consensus among Spanish residents of Ceuta about the identity
of their city. For some, Ceuta is a veritable melting pot of Andalusian culture. For other, any
notions of a multicultural identity are wreathed in issues of segregation and fears tied to
African migration. It is hard to say for certain, from the perspective of Spanish ceutíes,
whether their relationship with Morocco and Moroccans is anything more than strictly
economic. In wandering the cities’ streets and museums, it does seem as though Spanish
culture is predominant in both places. Without official signage in Arabic, and with the
shrouding of monuments to the cities’ North African heritage, like the Arab baths, it is hard
from an outsider’s perspective to see anything other than the supremacy of Spanish culture
and relegation of other cultures to the periphery. I cannot say for certain what the
significance is, but it is important to note the way that Spanish has officially (through
language designation and signage) and unofficially (through erasure of graffiti in Arabic)
asserted itself as the dominant cultural force in the two enclaves, despite the considerable
percentage in each enclave of people of non-Iberian origin.
Across the borders, in Northern Morocco, there is not a sizeable permanent
population of Spaniards. But clearly, there is some desire to appear as though there is a real
link with Spain (as well as the rest of Europe and the West) proven by the simple existence
of the smuggling economy. Certain goods, especially technology, can be hard to acquire in
Morocco, but comestibles and other household products can be found with ease, yet the
bulk of Moroccan smuggling concerns these items. Without a doubt, competitive pricing on
duty-free smuggled goods is a factor in explaining the popularity of Spanish goods, but that
does not tell the full story. In every conversation I had in Zaio about Spanish imports, the
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same simple belief kept popping up in conversation: “if it comes from Spain, it is higher
quality.”
What does this reveal about Moroccans in the country’s north? Perhaps there is a
certain status attained when one can fill their homes with Western products. Resulting
from decades of colonialism and subsequent central neglect under Hassan II, Northern
Morocco lags considerably in terms of development when compared to Rabat and other
major cities further south. Smuggling not only provides the north with the goods it needs,
but perhaps it allows the people of the north to feel empowered and have a (sometimes
literal) taste of the “good life.”
Anthropologists theorize that sometimes consumer goods have meaning beyond
economic exchange. For example, the Marcel Mauss believed that “value” is essentially a
social construct; goods that are bought, traded, or given need to be examined within the
context of the cultures or subcultures in which they exchanged to truly understand their
real and symbolic value (Mauss, 1922). In the context of smuggling goods from border
cities into Morocco, it would be critical to conduct further in-depth research to form better
understanding of why it is that Moroccans wish to purchase Spanish goods and what they
mean to them.
While some of the goods smuggled into Morocco allow citizens to live their lives like
their European neighbors, it is important to note that this dynamic is exploited by a
number of companies. Moroccans want to purchase “higher quality” goods from Spain, but
sometimes the goods they import are not even consumed by Spaniards. One prime example
of this is the line of cacao products produced by Borras S.L. in Ceuta. A popular treat found
all over Morocco, their Maruja bars are not commonly found in Spain, and their website
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even notes their strong presence in Northern Africa, especially in Morocco and Algeria
(Maruja, 2017). Equating a product’s European origin with higher quality is a dangerous
assumption, as Maruja has not officially been marketed as “chocolate” since 1952. In that
year, the company decided on a “strategic change,” and switched their production from
chocolate to a chocolate sucedáneo (substitute), whose primary selling point appears to be
that the product is less susceptible to melting under heat (ibid).
Even goods produced in Morocco will sometimes try to pretend to be European in
origin. In supermarkets all across the country, one can easily find a popular brand of juice
sold under the label of “Valencia.” Produced in Meknès, it is unclear what, if any, tie the
brand has to the city on the east coast of Spain, but this serves to further the notion that
there is some sort of value ascribed to products associated with the West.
The smuggling trade into Morocco clearly plays an important role in the country’s
national economy. What the goods themselves mean, however, is more ambiguous. Looking
at which products are brought into Morocco, and what value Moroccans ascribe to them,
could help uncover more about the complicated ways in which people in this region of the
world define themselves and live in multicultural societies. By attempting to understand
the underground economy, one can better understand the relationship between different
but interrelated cultures.
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Limitations
After discussing the findings of this research, it is important to acknowledge the
basic limitations of this study. The data presented herein was collected over the course of
just one month, and further research is required to draw larger conclusions. While I faced
many challenges in undertaking this project, there are four main limitations, which
absolutely must be addressed. First, the sample I have drawn from is small and the data
presented in this study may not be indicative of the various populations I describe. With
more time and resources, I would have tried to obtain a larger sample to draw from.
Second, there was a considerable language barrier to my research. Though I speak
fairly advanced Spanish and intermediate Arabic, there were moments in nearly every
interview where I would either not understand what was said to me, or I would be unable
to ask certain follow-up questions.
Additionally, it is important to consider that on several occasions, I was not present
for the interviews I describe. Direct quotation is mostly impossible, and the nature of these
interviews force me to trust the accuracy of another individual’s notes and memory.
Related to this point, researching sensitive topics is difficult, and it was critical for the sake
of this project that I made any concessions asked of me by people engaged in sub-rosa
activity of questionable legality to ensure their comfort as well as the candor of their
responses. It would have been helpful to interview these people myself, but establishing
these types of trusting relationships take time, which unfortunately I did not have much of.
Finally, as with any research that partially utilizes a participant/observer
methodology, my data is subject to my own inherent biases. Even the photographs I took
literally are through my own lenses: just as I selected certain things to capture visually and
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framed the shots as I did, I also no doubt saw, heard, and interpreted interviews within the
context of my own background.
Given the significant limitations of this research period, I am cautious to generalize
from the data I have collected.
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Further Research
Given the scale of this subject matter, and the myriad dimensions deserving of
exploration, further research is undoubtedly needed. As stated earlier, this project was
conducted over the course of just one month of study, and I was not able to obtain as many
interviews as I would have liked.
One possible direction for further research involves returning to Ceuta and Melilla
to conduct more interviews. With more time, I (or any other researcher for that matter)
could get a clearer picture of the internal and external relationships of the enclaves by
interviewing a larger number of Spanish and North African residents of the cities, as well as
potentially incorporating some elite interviews from Spanish officials.
At the borders and beyond, it would also be beneficial to continue interviewing.
Perhaps future scholarship will engage with police officers who work on the border to get a
another perspective on the dynamics described in this study. While I was quite fortunate to
have one smuggler who was willing to divulge so much information to me, it would be great
for future research to also include the thoughts and stories of more smugglers, both male
and female. As I learned, there are gender differences with regard to the type of goods
smuggled and the methods used to get goods across the borders. Interviewing more
grocers in the towns scattered around the borders could also yield more interesting
revelations, and interviews with their customers could provide greater insight into why
Spanish goods are so desirable and what they mean to those who purchase them given the
extraordinary and arduous measures required to bring them to market.
It would be useful for future researchers to delve more deeply into some of the
highly nuanced issues on which I scratched the surface. For example, trying to understand
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the ways in which language use and code-switching, or the formal and informal use (and
erasure) of Spanish/Arabic in these border cities, could be highly useful in trying to better
assess the meaning of the informal economy and identity.
Finally, having more time to conduct this type of research would be helpful in
furthering understanding of the complex nature of trade and what it means in both
economic and social senses on both sides of the border. One of the most important things
I’ve learned from doing this research is just how time-consuming it is to do research at the
granular level.
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Appendices
Appendix A – Interview Guidelines for Smugglers
1. Goods
A. What do you trade?
B. Are the goods you trade items that cannot easily be acquired in Morocco?
C. If not, why do you go through the hassle of getting ___ in Spain?
D. Why do you think Moroccans are interested in goods from Spain?
E. What kinds of things do Moroccans like from Spain?
2. Background/ Daily Life
A. What can you tell me about your daily routine?
B. How often do you work?
C. How long have you been doing this for?
D. Have you ever done another job?
3. Organization
A. How is your work organized?
B. Do you alone or work with others?
C. Do different people specialize in different types of goods?
D. Do other members of your family also trade?
4. Other
A. Have you ever had anyone question you when you go across the border? If so, what sort
of concerns do they have?
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B. Do you think Ceuta and Melilla should be part of Spain or Morocco? How would you react
if Spain agreed to cede control of the cities to Morocco?

Appendix B – Interview Guidelines for Ceuta/ Melilla Residents
1. Background
A. How long have you lived here for?
B. What languages do you speak?
C. Do you know any Arabic? Is it useful? Why?
Do you have family here? How long has your family lived here?
2. Multiculturalism/ Trade
A. In many ways, Ceuta serves as a bridge between Africa, the Arab World, and Europe.
How does that influence daily life in the city?
B. Have you ever been to Morocco?
C. Do you ever buy goods that come from Morocco? What kinds? Are these things you can’t
get in Ceuta?
3. Politics
1. The Moroccan government as well as the Arab League have called for Ceuta and the other
plazas de soberanía to be returned to Morocco. Is this something you agree with?
2. Is there a comparison to be made with Spanish claims to Gibraltar?
3. Do you feel that the Spanish government treats Ceuta as a full part of Spain?
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4. What are the biggest problems facing Ceuta?

Appendix C – Interview Guidelines for Moroccan Grocers

A. Products/ Smuggling
1. Are the items you sell ones that cannot easily be acquired in Morocco?
2. If not, why do you go through the hassle of getting ___ in Spain?
3. Why do you think Moroccans are interested in goods from Spain?
4. What kinds of things do Moroccans like from Spain?
5. Roughly what percent of your goods come from Spain?
6. How do you get them? (How many traders do you employ to get these goods? Are there
ever any problems with them?)
7. Do you think your customers are more likely to buy something if it has a label that's in
Spanish? Why is that?
8. Are you aware of any Moroccan goods that get sold in Spain? What kinds of things?
B. Politics
A. Do you think Ceuta and Melilla should be part of Spain or Morocco? How would you react
if Spain agreed to cede control of the cities to Morocco?
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